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STATEMENT 01 : THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
As part of a trust deed agreement, p] a :ii i it :i f: E -
appellant (hereinafter Madsen), makes mon* ily "budget" 
j: iaymei its t :> defendant respondent (I ler * • I -a ' • -r P» .*dent : ,.t 
Prudential accumulates such "budget" payments and maK* s 
annual payments for- raxtu; ar 1 insurance* Prudential .;-** 
consent Prudential has mane substantial profits or .-*uch 
investments. Madsen «•• intends that Prudential has been 
imyjst;, en r iched - • ,»ut J q e tfl 
payments. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Madsen n^^ k-- •• jwei court's order 
granting Prudential's IIK-LIV lot oQuinary judgment reversed, 
,-^p-i the order denying Madsen *s motion for partial summary 
uo^iVa:;! i. • >.'- •- o *:'::-. ^  • .- •* < H- * v ^ ! C " «• > •• * • r-T-
amount of the unjust enrichment arid or further proceedings 
on the class action issues consistent with Honorable hrv&iit. 
stayed t::- decision of -iran* in-j <-i o-nym-j class action 
status until the question 01 iiabili^j *.i, decidual . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During 1964, Madsen borrowed money from Prudential 
for the purpose of purchasing real estate. During the 
closing and as part of the financing arrangements, Madsen 
was required to sign a standard deed of trust prepared by 
Prudential (Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's Complaint). That 
document contained a provision requiring Madsen to pay, 
not only the monthly principal and interest payments, but 
also to pay monthly 1/12 of the estimated annual real estate 
taxes and insurance premiums into a "reserve" or "budget" 
fund for insurance and taxes. The language of the Deed of 
Trust is as follows: 
"A. To protect the security of 
the deed of trust, TRUSTOR agrees: 
2. To keep the buildings . . . 
insured against loss by fire . . . , 
and to pay the premiums therefor promptly 
when due . . . 
4. To pay before delinquent all 
taxes and assessments affecting said 
property. . . . 
"In addition to the monthly payments 
as provided in said note, the TRUSTOR 
agrees to pay to the BENEFICIARY, upon the 
same day each month, budget payments estimated 
to equal one-twelfth of the annual taxes and 
insurance premiums; said budget payments to 
be adjusted from time to time as required, 
and said budget payments are hereby pledged 
to the BENEFICIARY as additional security for 
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the full performance of this deed of trust and 
the note secured hereby. The Bu3get pay-
ments so accumulated may be withdrawn by the 
BENEFICIARY for the payment of taxes or 
insurance premiums due on the premises. 
The BENEFICIARY may at any time, without 
notice, apply said budget payments to the 
payment of any sums due under the terms of 
this deed of trust and the note secured 
hereby or either of them. TRUSTOR'S 
failure to pay said budget payments shall 
constitute a default under this trust,1' 
(Emphasis added^) 
i- ,„ ,.he time :-^  » • . : , 
they were aware of the "escrow" accouii wh . *;h <ii : not ;*ay 
'->*-' , 3 DUX. aid not >,f" i f * because rhis *s a 
standard procedure with most lend^..: .r .; .e . e.^-n 
had +-0 agree \ > make the me.nt-hly budq.?t payments for taxes and 
- i.^  i*a., • l * re f ise-1 financing, 
(Plaintiff's deposition a* «. ane - iteu .\ iefendant's 
memorandum supporting summary judgment at. ,) 
Q/xkr** Thai I In1 i i •> j h I I emeu I ill n m -ynwwifs f'ei t,iyps 
and insurance is standard, procedure j .>.r .nust lending institu-
tions is evidenced' u«- che federal regulations which require 
such budget paymer •_ - • *.<.••
 ;.• . 
percent of value made by federal savings and loan associations. 
»"-4r, ( ) * • ' i.-.x\. J -"T-A ;V i other similar reaula-
tj'jjis ce*J statutes tna^ compel «\ luinle i |»aymt "her 
situations. The Code of Federal Regulations specifically 
provici* • . : • 
[FHA mortgages] shall provide for 
such equal monthly payments by the 
mortgagor to the mortgagee as wi11 
amortize • the estimated amount ot 
all taxes ai I :i fi re and other hazard 
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insurance premiums . . . within a period 
ending one month prior to the dates on 
which the same become delinquent." 
(§203.19, C.F.R., 1971) 
A Federal Home Loan Bank regulation states: 
"A federal association may require 
that an equivalent of one-twelfth of 
the estimated annual taxes, assessments, 
insurance premiums and other charges on 
real estate security be paid in advance . . . 
to enable the association to pay such 
charges as they become due from the funds 
so received. . . . " 
(12 C.F.R. §545.6-11) 
In addition, the Utah Code allows savings and loan associations 
to require such budget payments as follows: 
"The association may require that 
the equivalent of one-twelfth of 
the estimated annual taxes, assessments, 
insurance premiums and other charges 
upon real estate security, or any of them, 
be paid each month in advance to the 
association in addition to interest 
and principal payments on its loans so 
as to enable the association to pay 
such charges as they become due from the 
funds so received. The association shall 
keep a record of the status of taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums and other 
charges on all real estate on which the 
association has made loans or which is 
owned by the association." (U.C.A. 
§7-7-5(a)(3)). 
The Deed of Trust provides in paragraph 4 that 
budget payments are pledged as security for performance of the 
Deed of Trust, and that such payments are to be used by 
Prudential to pay any amounts due under the Deed of Trust 
including payment of taxes and insurance premiums. Prudential 
holds such "budget" payments for up to one year before the 
taxes and insurance premiums are paid. Prudential engages 
-4-
i i t q u l a t | ) i l n ( I i n v r f i n q t h o s e " b u d g e t " t u n d s d u i i r n 
t h e t i m e t h e y a r e in P i u d e n l i a i , o p o s s e s s i o n , i . e . , b e J ore 
t h e t a x e s and i n s u r a n c e premiums a r e p a i d . P r u d e n t i a l h a s 
< a i n t d a j i . n l 1 I | i f i I 1 i ) I in il I ui i z e d u s e a n d 
i n v e s t m e n t o f t h e Madsen " b u d g e t " f u n d s . 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
P r u d e n t i a l ' s m o t i o n fox summary ] u d g m e n t was g r a n t e d 
a n d Mads c n mot J O I i l l il iiiirn i ? ^ | ilqirtoni U I I n i e d 
1>V t h e l o w e r c o u r t on t h e 1 5 t h d a y c f Mai d i , 19 7 6 . Madsen 
i i 1CM] II n o t i c e o t a p p e a l on t h e z~»th day o t M a r c h , 1 9 7 b . 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT FOR DEFENDANT TU HOLD 
"BUDGET" PAYMENTS CONSTITUTES A PLEDGE, 
K t i r i q r a p h 1 iwi I I | i I a t t a c h e d t o 
p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t , s t a t e s a s f o l l o w s : 
. . . said budget payments are hereby 
pledged to the BENEFICIARY as additional 
security for the full performance of this 
deed of trust and the note secured hereby• 
The budget payments so accumulated may 
be withdrawn by the BENEFICIARY for the 
payment of taxes and insurance premiums 
due on the premises." 
This language clearly creates a j ledqe. Not only does the 
instrument speciticaJJ m i tin* MI ! pledge, I nf if liltill 
the two iequirements of a pledge laid down by the U1 ih 
SuprPH, -Mjjf in Williams \ Esprey, li III tli >d 317, ^8 P. 2d 
903 (19t>i). Those two requirements arc I I tlu cxisttnr« )t 
a debt or obligation and (2) the transfer of personal 
property to the pledgee to be held as security and if 
necessary used for payment of the debt. The language of 
the Deed of Trust evidences a debt. Moreover, neither 
party to this lawsuit denies that defendants hold the 
mortgage on plaintiff's property and that a debt is thereby 
created. The second element is met by the express language 
of the Deed of Trust which states that the budget payments 
are to be held as additional security for its performance 
and that such payments may be applied against any amounts 
due thereunder. 
Where the language of a contract " . . . is clear 
and is not susceptible of more than one interpretation, the 
ordinary plain meaning of the words must be used." Bryant 
v. Deseret News Publishing Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 
355 (1951); See also, Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 
2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958). Such is the case here as the 
language quoted above and the discussion following that 
quotation shows that the language of the Deed of Trust is 
unambiguous in creation of a pledge. In such a case, the 
rule requires that the plain meaning of the words be used. 
The plain meaning is that a pledge was created. 
The law in Utah is clear that a pledgee who 
uses pledged property without the pledgor's authorization 
must account for any profits made because of such use in 
absence of a contrary agreement. Hoyte v. Upper Marvin Ditch 
Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 234 (1938); see also, Leggat v. 
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Palmer, 39 Mont. 302, 102 P.2d 327, 329 (1909); Story on 
Bailments, §331. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hoyte: 
" . . . when the property pledged is of 
such a character as not to be lessened by 
use, the pledgor does not incur liability 
by using it, but if from the use of it 
profits are derived, he must, in the 
absence of special agreement, account for 
them to the pledgor." 
In the case at bar, no evidence can be found in the record 
of an agreement allowing Prudential to keep profits made on 
the escrow fund. No evidence is in the record because no 
such agreement, written or oral, was ever made. Plaintiffs 
did not agree nor does the Deed of Trust provide that 
Prudential can even use the budget payments except as 
security and for payment of amounts due under the Deed of 
Trust. Under the Hoyte doctrine, the absence of such an 
agreement requires Prudential, as pledgee, to account 
for profits made on the pledged escrow fund. 
The rule stated above is also the one adopted 
universally in the United States today. See e.g. Thomas v. 
Waters, 350 Pa. 214, 38 A.2d 237, 241 (1941); Manuf. Trust Co. 
v. Bank of Yorktown, 282 N.Y.S. 507, 509 156 Misc. 793 
(1935); State v. Nicely, 18 P.2d 503, 506, 171 Wash. 
439 (1933); Restatement of Security §27 (1941). That this is 
the proper rule is evidenced by the fact that the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which has been adopted by every state 
except Louisiana, requires that any increase or profits on 
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pledged property in the form of money must be remitted to the 
debtor or applied against the debt, U.C.C. §9-207, The 
comments under that section make it clear that it is a 
codification of the common law. 
Not only is this the clear weight of authority in 
Utah and in the United States today, but the rule that a 
pledgor is entitled to the increase of profits from the pledged 
property has been a basic legal principal since ancient times, 
I. A. Rocurek and J. S. Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and 
Primitive Law 480, 481 (1915); Id, at 401, 4 S,P, Scott, The 
Civil Law, 196 97 n.l (1932). The Code of Manu promulgated 
between 400 B.C. and 200 A.D, state that "the fool who uses 
a pledge without the permission of the owner, shall remit 
half of his interest, as a compensation for (such) use.1' 
The same principal is embodied in the Code of Hammurabi which 
is believed to be the oldest civilized code of law, I.A. 
Rocureck and J. S. Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and Primitive 
Law, 401 (1915). 
As evidenced by the above discussion, the rule is 
universal that absent a contrary agreement a. pledgee who uses 
pledged property must account to the pledgor for profits 
made through such use. It is universal because it is the only 
fair and just result. The pledgee has made his profit by 
charging interest on the money loaned to the pledgee. To 
allow him to reap additional profits through use of the 
pledged property would result in injustice. This is especially 
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true when, as here, the contract is one of adhesion and the 
pledgor has no bargaining power to influence the matter. 
Such a basic universally accepted principal of fairness 
should not be overlooked by this court. 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT FINDS THE LANGUAGE OF THE DEED OF 
TRUST TO BE AMBIGUOUS, IT SHOULD CONSTRUE SUCH LANGUAGE 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT DRAFTER. 
If this court finds that the language of the 
Deed of Trust is not clear but is susceptible of more than 
one interpretation, it should find that the lower court 
erred by not construing the contract against the drafter, 
Prudential Federal, to find a contract of pledge. It is 
well established that Utah law requires an ambiguous or 
doubtful contract to be construed against the drafter. 
Wingets, Inc., v. Bitters 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 
(1972); Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972); 
General Mills v. Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (1943). 
This is especially so when the contract is one of adhesion on 
a printed form with blanks for the parties to fill in and the 
drafter " . . . has the advantage of a lender of money." 
General Mills, supra at 1094. It is also true that the 
drafter of a contract cannot later change its wording but 
must accept and be bound to the words he chose. Skousen v. 
Smith, 27 Utah 2d 231, 493 P.2d 1003 (1973). 
In the instant case, the Deed of Trust is a printed 
form drafted by Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, 
-g. 
a lender of money. Such facts require that the document be 
construed against the defendant drafter. This is especially 
true in light of the fact that Prudential not only drafted 
the form Deed of Trust but used its superior bargaining power 
in requiring Madsen to sign it. In such a case, Madsen 
had no influence on the wording of the contreict. The drafter 
is most at fault in creating the confusion, and he should 
likewise suffer the greater consequences. 
The only way the Deed of Trust can be construed as 
not creating a pledge is if Paragraph 4 is either deleted 
or rewritten. Such action is certainly not allowable under 
Utah law, especially when the party to be benefited by such 
revision is the drafter of the document who chose the very 
language sought to be changed. In Skousen, supra at 1005, 
the Utah Supreme Court refused to delete the word "on" in 
a contract and substitute the word "of" in its place at the 
request of the defendant who drafted the writing. The 
court, at 1005, said it is ". . . elementary that parties 
may be bound by the language they deliberately used in their 
contract irrespective of the fact that it appears to result 
in improvidence. . . . " If the court would not allow deletion 
and substitution of one preposition in Skousen, surely it 
would be improper to delete or revise a whole paragraph in 
the instant case so as to find something other than a pledge. 
Prudential Federal chose the language of Paragraph 4 and 
the lower court erred by granting it summary judgment and 
not finding that a pledge exists between the parties. 
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POINT III 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT A PLEDGE DOES NOT EXIST, 
THEN A PRINCIPAL AGENT RELATIONSHIP IS PRESENT WHICH REQUIRES 
THE DEFENDANT TO ACCOUNT FOR PROFITS MADE ON THE BUDGET 
PAYMENTS. 
The relationship between plaintiffs and defendant 
is best characterized as a pledge because that is what 
the Deed of Trust says it is. However, the relationship 
might also be described as one of agency. In Continental 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d §70, 384 P.2d 
796, 800 (1963), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the definition 
of agency found in the Restatement of Agency 2d §1 by stating 
as follows: 
"Agency is the fiduciary relation which 
results from the manifestation of consent 
by one person to another that the other 
shall on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to 
act." 
The court also said that the existence of an agency does not 
depend on the payment of a wage or fee by the principal to the 
agent. In addition, it is recognized that an agency can be 
created by conduct alone and no written agreement is 
necessary. Ramey v. Myers, 11 C.A. 2d 679, 245 P.2d 360 
(1952); Anderson v. Thacker 76 C.A. 2d 50, 65, 172 P.2d 533 
(1946). 
The instant case falls under the definition 
of agency found in the Continental case above. Under the 
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Deed of Trust Madsen is required to pay for taxes and 
insurance. Rather than pay these amounts directly, Madsen 
turns over to Prudential each month 1/12 of the annual 
amount for insurance and taxes. Prudential is then bound 
by paragraph 4 of the Deed of Trust to use the funds received 
from Madsen to pay for insurance and taxes or other amounts 
due thereunder. Because Prudential is bound to use Madsen's 
money in a certain way, an agency relation is established. 
Note, the Mortgage Banking Process, 7 Houston L. Rev. 70, 
85 (1969). Madsen is the principal and Prudential is 
the agent through whom the monies are transferred to third 
parties. 
Establishment of an agency relationship puts 
obligations on the agent when dealing with the principal's 
property. One such obligation is that an agent who handles 
his principal's property cannot keep any profits made thereby, 
except for what he is entitled to in the way of compensation 
for his services. Adams v. Herman, 106 C.A. 2d 92, 234 P.2d 
695 (1951); Savage v. Mayer, 33 CA.A 2d 548, 203 P.2d 9, 10 
(1949); Steiner v. Rowley, 35 C.A. 2d 713, 221 P.2d 9 (1950) 
This rule is stated at §388 of the Restatement 
of Agency 2d as follows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent 
who makes a profit in connection with 
transactions conducted by him on behalf 
of the principal is under a duty to 
give such profit to the principal." 
Comment A to §388 makes it clear that an agent must give such 
profit to the principal even if it was not received in violation 
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of his duty or loyalty. 
The above discussion aptly describes the situation 
found in the present case. Plaintiffs paid budget payments 
to Prudential, not for Prudential's use but for the payment 
of amounts due under the Deed of Trust. In the capacity as 
the plaintiff's agent, Prudential was bound to act in a fiduciary 
capacity with respect to the funds held. Restatement of 
Agency 2d §13. Because Prudential breached its fiduciary duty 
as an agent by using the budget payments for investment 
purposes without the principal's consent, the law requires 
that Prudential turn such unfair profits over to their 
rightful owners, the plaintiffs. 
POINT IV 
THE BUDGET PAYMENTS CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL DEPOSIT 
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT FOR PROFITS. 
Additional support for the finding that Prudential 
Federal should account for profits made through investment 
of the budget payments can be found in the law of bank deposits. 
Bank deposits fall into two categories — general and special. 
When money is deposited in a bank with no expressed intent 
that a special deposit be created, the funds are deemed to be 
held by the bank as a debtor to the depositor and the bank 
can commingle the funds with its own assets and use them as it 
wishes, 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks §§360, 364. No trust is 
created as a ". . . debt is not a trust,*1 Restatement of 
Trusts 2d: Trusts §12. When money is left with a bank to 
-13-
be used for a specific purpose, such as payment of a 
debt or transfer to a particular person, a special deposit 
is created. Id. at §366. In such as case, " . . . the money 
does not become the property of the bank. The fund 
is merely entrusted to the bank as a trustee or bailee." 
Andrew v. Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712, 715, 
263 N.W. 493, 497 (1935) Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. 
Bank, Mass, 291 N.E. 2d 609 (1973); McGregor v. First 
Farmers'-Merchant Bank & Trust Co., 180 Wash. 440, 40 P.2d 
144, 147 (1935); Engleman v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. 
Ass'n, 98 C.A. 2d 237, 219 P.2d 868 (1950). 
The latter law governing special deposits controls 
the instant case. Specifically, Madsen deposited money with 
Prudential to be held for a particular purpose. Neither 
the parties nor the Deed of Trust disputes the fact that 
the budget payments were held by Prudential Federal for a 
particular purpose — the payment of insurance and taxes or 
other amounts due under the Deed of Trust. Such facts created 
a special deposit with Prudential as the trustee or bailee 
and Prudential had no authority to use the funds as its own. 
Andrew, supra. Because Prudential Federal has violated its 
duty by taking these specially deposited funds and investing 
them, Prudential now owes Madsen an account for profits made 
thereby. 
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POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S RETENTION OF PROFITS MADE ON ESCROW 
ACCOUNTS CONSTITUTES UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND AS SUCH SHOULD NOT 
BE ALLOWED. 
The basic question in deciding whether defendant 
has been unjustly enriched is one of fairness. Applied to 
the present case the issue is whether it is more fair to allow 
Prudential Federal to retain the profits made by investment 
of the budget payments or whether those profits should be 
turned over to Madsen. Stated differently, would Prudential 
Federal be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to retain 
profits made on money deposited for the payment of insurance, 
taxes and other amounts? 
The question above can be answered only by deter-
mining who is the owner of the profits. Ordinarily, 
profits belong to the one who expends efforts in earning them 
or the one who owns the capital or property producing the 
increase. (That use of another's property entitles the 
owner to a return is evidenced by rental payments made for 
the use of property and by interest paid for the use of money.) 
In this case, both are present. Prudential Federal has 
expended time and energy in administering the funds and it 
should be paid for such efforts. The owner of the funds 
however should also be compensated for the use of his property. 
As Prudential used their own expertise, time, and 
effort in investing the funds, they should be compensated. 
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As the property invested was owned by Madsen, he is 
also entitled to be compensated. The profit made is correctly 
attributed to input received from both Madsen and Prudential. 
Without both — the property and the investment efforts — 
no profit would have been earned. The problem in this case 
is that Prudential is attempting to keep both the profit 
attributable to its managerial skills and the profit attributable 
to the use of Madsen's capital for itself. 
An illustration of the magnitude of the unjust 
enrichment which lending institutions reap from investment 
of escrow accounts is detailed in a law review note entitled 
Lender Accountability and the Problem of Noninterest-Bearing 
Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 56 Boston University Law Rev. 516, 
533 (19 74) The author of that note points out that despite 
banking industry claims of no profits on escrow accounts, 
an independent study by the Massachusetts Commissioner of 
Banks indicates that banks in Massachusetts make a substantial 
profit on such accounts. Specifically, ". . . in 19 71, 
the mutual savings banks collectively netted a profit of $4,000,000 
and state cooperative banks earned close to a million dollars 
in profits." Id., at 5 35. The unjust enrichment at issue 
therefore is substantial as these figures illustrate. And these 
figures compose only the profits made for one year in one 
state. Certainly it is unjust to allow a practice which 
enables lending institutions to make profits for their 
relatively few shareholders at the expense of tens of thousands 
of mortgagors. This is especially true when overreaching, 
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unequal bargaining power, and contracts of adhesion, unfair 
in and of themselves, are the methods used by the lenders 
which enables them to continue this practice. 
As prevention against unjust enrichment, the court 
should require Prudential to account for profits made through 
investment of the escrow accounts and to pay Madsen the 
profits attributable to the use of their funds. Such relief 
has been advocated by several commentators in this area. 
Attack on Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts in Mortgages, 47 
Temple L.Q. 352 (1974); Lender Accountability and the Problem 
of Non-Interest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 54 B.U.L. 
Rev. 517, (1974); Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow 
Accounts; Judicial and Legislative Developments, 2 3 
Syracuse L. Rev. 845 (1972). 
In fashioning the relief for unjust enrichment, 
the court should remember that this is an equitable proceeding 
and as such, the court has broad power to tailor relief to the 
circumstances. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
If the Court determines that an accounting for past profits 
would be too burdensome on Prudential, the least that should 
be required is that profits on such funds should be paid 
to Madsen from the date of this opinion forward. 
The court is reminded that Madsen is not asking 
for all of the profits made through investment of the 
escrow account. Indeed, Prudential is entitled to some of those 
profits as compensation for administering and investing the 
fund. Madsen asks only for the profits which rightfully 
-17-
belongs to them. This would include only the excess profits 
or the unjust enrichment. Madsen is aware that a decision 
on how the profits should be split may require that this case 
be remanded to the lower court for a determination of what 
Prudential is entitled to in the way of a reasonable management 
fee. 
POINT VI 
PRUDENTIAL'S ARGUMENT THAT A FINDING FOR MADSEN 
WILL CREATE HAVOC IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY IS UNFOUNDED. 
Madsen anticipates that Prudential will argue as 
they did in their memorandum in support of their motion for 
summary judgment that a finding for Madsen which requires 
an accounting of profits made on these escrow accounts would 
create more problems than it would solve and that it would 
create havoc in and unduly burden the banking industry. 
Such contentions are unfounded. The Bank of America, the 
largest banking institution in the world, announced some time 
ago that it would begin paying the regular passbook savings 
rate of interest on mortgage escrow accounts (less the bank's 
cost of providing insurance and tax payment services) effective 
January 1, 1976. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 27, 1975, Part 3 
at 18. Bank of America also stated that its decision would 
affect about 160,000 of its home mortgages. 
"B of A to Pay Interest on Mortgage 
Impound Funds in a major concession 
to California consumer advocates, 
Bank of America announced Wednesday 
that it will begin paying interest on 
home mortgage "impound" accounts — 
the money banks and savings and loans 
often collect from homeowners to pay 
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insurance premiums and property taxes. 
Beginning Jan. 1, 1976, the San 
Francisco-based bank said it would pay 
the regular passbook savings rate (currently 
5% annually) on such accounts, less the 
bank's cost of providing insurance and 
tax payment services. 
A spokesman for Bank of America said 
the service costs 'should run about 1%, 
leaving the homeowner with a net interest 
gain of approximately 4%.' 
Bank of America would be the first 
major state lender to pay interest on 
impound accounts, although a number of 
large banks and savings and loan associa-
tions are known to have been considering 
such a move for many months. 
'We've been looking at it for quite 
a while,' said an official with a rival 
California bank, 'and I know most of the 
other big banks have, too. Now that Bank 
of America has done it, I wouldn't be 
surprised if most of us followed suit pretty 
quickly.' 
A number of consumer groups and state 
politicians have been urging banks and 
S&Ls to pay interest on impound accounts 
for several years, charging that the lenders 
benefited unduly from the use of their 
customers' funds. 
Two separate pieces of legislation that 
would require banks and S&Ls to pay 
interest on such accounts currently are 
being considered in Sacramento. 
In announcing its decision Wednesday, 
Bank of America said about 160,000 of 
its home mortgage accounts would be affected 
by the upcoming change, including FHA and VA 
loan accounts for which the collection of 
funds in anticipation of property taxes and 
insurance premiums is required by law. 
Spokesmen for two large savings and loans 
in the Los Angeles area said they were 
'surprised' by Bank of America's announce-
ment. They said their firms would now be 
forced to consider similar plans." 
If Bank of America can accommodate a policy change affecting 
160,000 mortgages, certainly Prudential Federal can accomplish 
a similar change when only 20,388 mortgages are involved. 
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(p. 7 of defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment). 
Moreover, the New York statutes were amended in 
19 74 to require all banks within that state to pay interest 
on mortgage escrow accounts effective April 1, 19 74. 
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Banking Law §14-b 
(1974 Supp.). The state of New York which contains the 
greatest number, dollar wise, of banking institutions in 
the world has been requiring its banks to pay interest on 
mortgage escrow accounts for over two years and no great 
calamity has resulted. If it can be done in New York, it 
can be done in Utah. Furthermore, bank trust departments 
routinely account for profits made on funds expressly held 
by them in trust. It should be no greater burden to require 
them to do so with mortgage escrow accounts. Defendants 
cry of hardship is therefore unfounded as other banking 
institutions have been able to account for such profits. 
1. Other states also require payment of interest on 
escrow accounts and the banks involved have been able to do 
so without serious effects. See, Gen Stat of Conn. §33-10 
(1975); A.CM. §183:61; see also, Tierney v. Whitestone 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 77 Misc. 2d 284, 353 N.Y.S. 2d 104, 110 
(Civ. Ct. Queens Co. 19 74) where it is stated that similar 
legislation is expected to be adopted in Oregon, Minnesota, 
N. Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia. 
-20-
POINT VII 
PRIOR CASE LAW IN THIS AREA IS NOT CONTROLLING HERE, 
The issue of whether a mortgagee's collection of 
impound accounts for insurance and taxes in connection with 
monthly mortgage payments imposes a duty upon the mortgagee 
to pay interest or account for profits made on such accounts 
has been the subject of increased litigation. See Carpenter 
v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, Mass,, 291 N.E, 2d 609 (1973); 
Buchanon v. Brentwood Federal Savings & Loan Assfn,, 457 Pa, 
135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974); Abrams v, Crocker-Citizens National 
Bank, 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 114 Cal, Rpt. 913 (1974); Surrey 
Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank, 36 N,Y, 2d 173, 325 N.E, 
2d 527 (1975); Brooks v. Valley Natyl Bank, Ariz. 
, 539 P.2d 958 (1975); Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 13 111. App. 3d 578, 301 N.E. 2d 47 (1973); Sears 
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 1 111. App. 3d 62, 275 N.E. 
2d 300 (1971). The reason for the increased litigation in this 
area is very well stated by the following quote: 
"The concept of setting aside a pro-
rata share of annual tax and insurance 
costs each month in a separate account 
arises from the experience of lenders 
during the depression of the 19 30fs, when 
many people lost their homes in tax fore-
closures. In order to make mortgage loans 
more attractive to lenders, the Federal 
Housing Administration made escrow accounts 
mandatory on all FHA-insured mortgage loans. 
At that time, interest rates paid on 
savings accounts were so low - around 1 
or 2 per cent - that no thought was given 
to payment of interest on escrow accounts. 
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In fact, some lenders charged an extra 
fee for handling the accounts. Over the 
years, the prepayment of tax and insurance 
payments into escrow accounts that bear 
no interest became established practice 
within the lending industry, not only 
for government-insured loans, but for 
conventional mortgage loans as well. 
But times have changed, passbook 
interest rates are no longer at 1 per 
cent. The amount of money held in savings 
accounts is at an all-time high and the 
problem of tax foreclosures today is 
nowhere near what it was in the 19 30's. 
As for the escrow funds lenders hold, 
it has become an accepted practice for 
many lenders to commingle these funds 
with other money invested for profit. 
Thus, the lenders have become accustomed 
to substantial income from the investment 
of mortgage borrowers' escrow funds, 
and seldom do they share those earnings 
with the people who own the money. 
There are no national figures to show 
how much mortgage lenders earn from the 
interest-free use of escrow money, but 
a study of Prof. John A. Spanogle, Jr., 
of the University of Maine School of Law, 
estimates it at $100 million a year." 
"Homeowners v. Lenders - a Question of 
Interest", 38 Consumer Report 202 (1973). 
Some, but not all, of the cases in this area have 
been decided adversely to the mortgagors. Plaintiffs anticipate 
that Prudential will rely heavily upon the following cases 
cited by Prudential to the lower court. Brooks v. Valley 
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1975); Zelickman v. Bell 
Federal Savings, 301 N.E. 2d 47 (111. 1973). Madseft admits 
that a few cases have been decided in other jurisdictions which 
have considered similar issues and that such cases appear 
to support Prudential's position. Madsen, however, suggests 
that the court view Prudential's authorities from the following 
perspective: 
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) The highest court of a state is not bound 
by the decisions of other state courts but can 
choose to reject them all or accept and apply 
the reasoning which it feels best states the 
law. Ashton-Jenkins Co, v, Bramel, 56 Utah 
587, 192 P, 273 (1920), 
It is not even bound to accept the reasoning 
having a numerical majority. This is especially 
true when the issue involves a new and unsettled 
area of the law and the courts which have con-
sidered the matter are not in agreement, 
) The cases favorable to Prudential's position 
are not controlling here as they all turned 
on the issue of a trust, Brooks at 961, and did 
not discuss the legal theories of pledge and 
agency which Madsen argues here. Indeed, 
Madsen is not even asking the court to decide 
the existence of an express trust, 
) The primary issue before this court is the 
construction and interpretation of the Deed of 
Trust or contract between the parties. No 
court has ever considered the specific language 
contained in the Deed of Trust before this 
court. Only one case has been located which 
even contained a Deed of Trust with similar 
language, Zelickman v% Bell Fed, ,Sav« and Loan 
Ass'n, 301 N,E. 2d 47 (111, 1973) and that court 
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did not discuss the pledge theory. In 
accordance with the strong policy favoring 
freedom of contract, this court should not 
look to cases from other jurisdictions involving 
similar facts but different contract language. 
Instead, it should focus on the language of 
the Deed of Trust before the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of the Deed of Trust creates a common 
law pledge. Even if the language is ambiguous, it should 
be construed against the drafter, especially in a contract 
of adhesion. Since the "budget" funds were held by Prudential 
in pledge, Prudential must account to Madsen for any profit 
or increase which Prudential has earned by unauthorized 
use of the fund. This same result would prevail under the 
law of agency or banking fairness and equity demand that 
Madsen share in the profits which Prudential has earned by the 
unauthorized use of Madsen!s property. The ruling of the 
lower court should be reversed* 
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